










theory.   However,   the   notion   of   causation   this 
theory   is  based on confronts   further  problems  in 




and   competition   are   clear   (and   perhaps   not   the 




the  most   relevant  approaches,   structural  equation 
models and ranking analysis of causation provide 
appropriate answers.   
Keywords:   decision,   causation,   prisoner's 
dilemma, preemption, counterfactual.
1. The prisoner's dilemma
The   dilemma   has   taken   many   shapes   since   its 
original   formulations   [1].   New   formulations   [2] 
will be better suited for present purposes, which are 
based   only   on   the   one­attempt   version   of   the 
problem,   letting   aside   its   iterated   versions.   Two 
prisoners   situated   in   unconnected   cells   have   the 
same   two options:   stay  silent  or   talk  about   their 
crime.   Further,   they   are   aware   of   the   following 
conditions: if both decide to talk, then both will get 
ten years  of prison;   if  both decide  to  stay silent, 
both get one year of prison; if one of them talks and 
the other stays silent, then the first one goes free 




T 0 10 (1)
Here   the   rows   represent   the  decision:   staying 
silent   (S)  or   talk   (T).  The columns represent   the 
possible   outcomes   given   the   other   prisoner's 
decision. A good manner to analyse this problem is 




expected   utility,   defined   above)   is   talking   rather 
than   cooperating.   Nevertheless,   once   the   agent 




This   dilemma   can   take   many   forms.   It   is   well 
known,   e.g.,   that   prisoners'   dilemma   is   closely 
connected to   Newcomb's problem. Some authors 
[3]  have   shown  that  both  are   the   same  problem, 
while   others   [4]   have   argued   that   not   every 
formulation of  Newcomb's problem is a prisoners' 
dilemma.   Since     Newcomb's   problem   is   better 
understood under a causal notion of decision [5][6], 
one might need to  introduce causal   relations into 
some versions of the prisoners' dilemma.
One important element of introducing causation 
into   decision   analysis   is   connected   with   the 
distinction between  evidential  and  causal  decision 
theories   [7].  While   the   former   suggest   that   an 
agent's  decision can be considered as  part  of   the 
evidence for certain outcome, the latter are based 
on  the  causal  dependence  between  the agent  and 
the   outcome.   According   to   evidential   decision 
theory,   the   agent   should  maximise   the   expected 
value   of   his   options,   conditionalising   the 
probability   of   the   possible   outcomes   (O)   on   his 
action (A):
V(A) = Σj P(Oj|A)V(Oj) (2)
The   maximisation   of   expected   value   thus 
defined leads to irrational decisions, like preferring 
to  avoid  the  medical  examination because   it  will 
lower   the   probability   of   a   bad   diagnose.   The 
criterion used in definition (2) suggests the agent to 
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change his mind, because his decision might be an 
evidence to think that the other prisoner is going to 
do   the   same.   Causal   decision   theory   replaces 
conditional   probabilities   with   counterfactual 
conditionals,   in   order   to   define  expected   utility, 
which should be maximised in rational  decisions. 
The   difference   between   the   words  'value'  and 
'utility'  is based on at least three reasons. The first 
is the continuation of the original notation used by 




meaning   of   'utility',   which   is   near   to   the 
conceptions of  causal  usefulness  [5]  and  efficacy 
[7].   The   third   reason   has   to   do  with   the  more 
quantitative character of  V­utility that depends on 










using   counterfactual   sentences.   These   sentences 





Counterfactual   dependence   is   not   transitive, 
whence   causal   dependence   cannot   be   transitive 
either. However, the transitive relation of causation 
can   be   constructed   through   a   chain   of   causal 
dependencies   [8].  Dependency  hypotheses  permit 
the agent to ignore the occurrences that escape his 
control in order to achieve his goals. That suggests 
him   to   confess   in     prisoners'   dilemma,   because 
what   the other  prisoner  decides  does  not  depend 
causally   on   what  he  decides,   i.e.   it   is   not   a 
consequence of the dependence hypothesis. In the 
following   section   I   will   briefly   introduce   the 
structural   model   of   causation,   which   does   not 
replace  definition (5),  but   reinforces   it.  Although 
the variation between different versions of causal 
decision theory is not huge, it has been shown that 










formed   by   a   set   of   functional   equations,   which 
describes the dependencies of the variables on their 
so called  parents  and disturbances  or  unobserved 
variables   of   the   system.  Through   the  notion   of 
intervention,   the   model   can   be   modified 
counterfactually without changing the values of the 
other   variables.   In   this   sense,   the   agent's  action 
cannot serve as evidence for a certain outcome in 
his   decision   nor   can   it   be   taken   as   one   more 






causal   model   expressed   in   counterfactual 
conditions.  Although  the  outcome  is   taken   to  be 
conditioned   in   a   probabilistic   way   by   the 
intervention, it does not mean that the definition is 
similar   to   the   expected   value   explained   in   the 




Definition   (7)   says   that   the  probability   that  y 
occurs   given   the   intervention  x  is   equal   to   the 
probability  of  a  counterfactual  conditional:   if   the 
variable  X  had  the value  x,   the variable  Y  would 
have   the   value  y.   In   order   to   reveal   the   causal 
dependences  and   independences  of   the  prisoners' 
dilemma,   a   causal   graph   should   be   constructed 
connecting the variables in play. Let A be the two­
valued  action  variable   that   stands   for   the  agent's 
possible options,  O  be the four­valued occurrence 
variable standing for the possible outcomes, which 
also   depend   on  P,   the   two­valued   occurrence 
variable   standing   for   the   other   prisoner   and   his 
options.





















agent's   decision   either,  which  means   that,   under 
causal   decision   theory,   the   agent   should   neither 
consider   the other  prisoner's  possible  act  nor  his 
decision  itself  as  evidence   in   favour  of  a  certain 
outcome.  The agent   is  absolutely uncertain about 
what the other prisoner is going to choose. 
However, the alternative of staying silent in the 
dilemma   comes   from   the   thought   that   there   is 




ex  hypothesi  both  prisoners   are   in  different  cells 
that  are unconnected  to each other,  which means 




Another   account,   very   similar   to   the   described 
above,  defines  causal   relations  through subjective 
ranking   functions   [10].   These   are   functions   of 






this   account   of   subjective   probabilities   after 
conditionalising;   conditional   probabilities   have 
trouble  when extreme  low values  are  considered. 
That   won't   be   a   problem   for   the   analysis   of 
decision,   though,   since   it   would   be   strange   (or 
useless)   to  give  possible   actions   an   extreme   low 
probability. It  is argued that the structural models 
for   causation   can   be   transferred   to   the   causal 
account of ranking functions, since both are based 
on   the   same   laws   for   probabilistic   independence 
[10].  The  manner   in  which   both   approaches   are 
related   is   more   than   interesting,   but   further 
similarities will not be analysed here.
Sufficient   and   necessary   causation   can   be 
defined   using   ranking   functions.   Let     be   theϰ  
ranking   function  and  B be   the  proposition  about 
some set of obtaining circumstances:
C ↝ E ↔  (E|C B) <  (E|ϰ ∩ ϰ ~C B)∩ (10)
The difference between sufficient and necessary 
causes   lies   in   how high   is   the   value   given   to   a 
certain ranking, e.g. if the quantity of the right side 
of definition (10) is near to the one of the left side, 
the   proposition   in   question   might   express   a 
sufficient cause for its effect, while it  might be a 
necessary   cause,   if   the   difference   between   both 
sides is too high.
This   account   could   show   that   the   optimal 
decision in prisoners' dilemma is to stay silent and 
cooperate,  if  the situation is repeated many times 
[11].   Under   those   presuppositions   it   might   be 
reasonable to think that somehow the agent's  and 
the  other  prisoner's   actions   influence   each  other, 
but such  kind of versions are outside the scope of 
this  work.   In   any  case,   it  would  not  be   singular 
causation what connects them. It has been shown 
elsewhere   that   earlier   accounts   of   counterfactual 
causation, like the one explained in definition (5) 
are   special   cases   of   the   ranking   account   for 
causation   [10][12].   Unfortunately,   this   reduction 
can   only   succeed   if   a   further   condition   is 
introduced   that   imposes   the   precedence   of   the 
cause   over   its   effect.  This   supposition   is   neither 
needed in original counterfactual causation nor in 
the   structural   model   account.   Anyway,   the 
relevance   of   taking   counterfactual   causation   into 
ranking   causation   lies   on   the   solution   the   latter 






the   sense  of  definition   (4)   in  order   to  provide   a 
notion of expected utility.




very   much   connected   to   counterfactuals.   Every 
causal  decision   theory  based  on  a   counterfactual 
account  of  causation  might  suffer   from the  same 
difficulties that the latter has been confronted with. 
Preemption   is   one   of   them.   This   problem—
discussed very often nowadays [13]—arises when, 
among two potential causes of an event, the actual 
one   succeeds   because   it   interrupts   the   other.  A 
causal graph might represent this well. Let C be the 
actual cause of E, and C' be the potential cause, i.e. 




the   actual   cause   in   such   situations,   because  the 
second counterfactual conditional does not obtain; 
if the actual cause had not been the case, then it is 
not   true   that   the  effect  would  not  have  been   the 
case,   because   the   back­up   cause   was   there   to 
produce  it.  The preemption problem is a  kind of 
overdetermination.   However,   cases   of   symmetric 
overdetermination—i.e. where two or more events 
taken together  are the cause and each of   them is 
necessary   to   produce   the   effect—might   be 
explained in the same way as preemption [8].
A very usual scenario of preemption happens in 
group  decision   theory,  when  an   individual   agent 
comes up with a solution before his partners, but 
nevertheless   the   decision   is   taken   by   the  whole 
group.  Consensus  is  a  model   for  decision   theory 
that  seeks  to avoid sharp preemption [14],  which 
might   reduce   decisional   dictatorship.   However, 
when time is a relevant factor, agents might reach 













counterfactual   base,  which   gets   difficulties   from 
preemption   cases,   then   there   could   be   situations 
where   the   agent   tries   to   decide   according   to 
expected   utility   and   still   obtains   irrational 
outcomes  after  all.  A decision  analysis   that  does 
not   tackle   preemption   carefully   might   end   up 
suggesting that an agent should not work towards 
an idea, because his reflections are not going to be 
the cause  of   the  final  group decision either  way, 




Preemption   cases   undoubtedly   pose   a   lot   of 
problems for causal decision theory and they could 
raise   further   difficulties   because   of   the  ways   in 
which   such   account   handles   prisoners'   dilemma. 
Since that is one of the best benefits of causality­
based   decisions,   cases   conjoining   both   problems 
are more than threatening for such theory.  
A modification  in   the  prisoners'  dilemma can 
generate such a situation. Notice that preemption in 
decision is not necessarely a prisoner's dilemma. In 









T 0 5∨10 (12)
The   causal   parameters   described   by   the 
structural equations cannot be the same as in the set 
of   equations   (9).   Let   two   new   conditions   be 
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the order in which the confessions took place. If the 
agent   confesses   first,   he   gets   only   five   years   of 
prison.   If   he   talks   late,   he   will   get   the   same 
sentence   as   in   the  original  dilemma.  The  causal 
graph stays the same as in figure (11), except that 
the variable O becomes five­valued. 
In   a  preemption   dilemma  the   agent  must   act 
quickly,   which   means   that   he   should   look   for 
preemption. The optimal decision is no longer the 




be   explained   with   clarity   and   considering   the 
relevant   causal   relations.  Otherwise,   the   agent   is 
likely to ignore that he influences the variable of 
interest  with   certain   detail.   Thus,   a   dependency 
hypothesis   based  on   naïve  causal   counterfactuals 
would   fail   in   front   of   decision   cases   where 








it   occurred   [16].   Nevertheless,   such   a   solution 
might lead to indistinguishable spurious causes [8]. 
It   has   also   been   established   that   a   poor 
understanding   of   causation   in   competitive   cases 
might   lead   to   irrelevance   in   decisions,  waste   of 
efforts, or even to epistemological mistakes [17].
Other   ways   of   confronting   preemption   are 
proposed by the structural  model account and by 
the   ranking   analysis   of   causation.   The   first 
approach   introduces   the   notion   of  sustenance, 
which emphasises the capacity of the actual cause 
to  maintain   the   value   of   the   effect   when   some 
structural contingences are suppressed [6, p. 316]. 
Thus, the property of sustenance lies between the 
concepts   of   production   and   dependence.  On   the 
other   hand,   the   ranking   theory   of   causation 
manages   the   problem   of   overdetermination   in 
general appealing to the notion of additional cause 
[10, p. 110]. A table of   rankings of the outcome 




~C' 0   2 (14)
The value of the effect's occurrence in absence 
of an additional cause is not much higher than in its 




are   notions   that   provide   precise   responses   to 
preemption in general, and to more particular cases 
of   preemption   dilemmas   when   considered   in 
decision theoretic contexts.
7. Conclusion
Some   accounts   of   decision   based   on   causal 
relations have been briefly presented, showing that 
the  original  approach  handles  well   the  prisoners' 
dilemma   [5][7],   but   that   it   might   lead   to 
irrationality   if   confronted  with  preemption   cases. 
This kind of problem is called preemption dilemma 
and I am sure that it  is a real problem for causal 
decision   theory.   Solutions   were   considered   and 
recommended under the scope of structural models 
and ranking theory of causality. It is important that 
such   solutions   maintain   what   causal   decision 
theory has done for the prisoners' dilemma. In that 
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